About Book

This book provides an in-depth historical and archival investigation into the “Moro Doctrine”––also known as the “Lodo Moro”––a clandestine security arrangement between the Italian state and Palestinian militant organisations during 1969–1986. Drawing upon extensive archival evidence from over twenty archives across Italy, the United States, Germany, France, Britain, and Russia, the author demonstrates that the Lodo Moro was not a unilateral or personal initiative of Prime Minister Aldo Moro but instead a structured state policy shaped by Cold War geopolitical constraints, intelligence alliances, and the pragmatism of European security calculus. The book argues that Italy’s decision to tacitly allow Palestinian groups safe passage and logistical space in exchange for non-aggression toward Italian territory must be reassessed as part of a broader international environment where Western and Middle Eastern actors engaged in covert bargaining to manage terrorism risks. Its relevance today lies in its illumination of how states navigate the ethical and strategic dilemmas of negotiating with non-state armed groups, revealing patterns that resonate with contemporary debates on state resilience, covert counterterrorism diplomacy, hostage policies, and the moral boundaries of security governance. It also provides critical insights for policymakers and researchers seeking to understand how historical state–terrorist arrangements shape modern norms on prevention, deterrence, and international cooperation against ideological violence.This book represents a significant scholarly contribution to the understanding of Cold War terrorism, secret diplomacy, and Italy’s political history. Its archival rigor and reinterpretation of the Lodo Moro make it an essential reference for researchers exploring state responses to transnational terrorism and the evolution of European security strategies.