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This article maps the online ecology of Syrian jihadi groups—especially Islamic State, Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham—by analyzing how Twitter disruption affected their presence over time (2017–2018) and by examining where these groups link their audiences, revealing their preferred “other” platforms. The authors find that while Twitter became increasingly hostile to Islamic State accounts (with more takedowns), HTS and Ahrar al-Sham maintained more stable communities; the study also shows that these groups link to a variety of external platforms, including archive sites, messaging applications, and less mainstream social media. The relevance of this research to the current era is significant: it sheds light on how jihadi actors adapt to de-platforming and content removal by redirecting their audiences to alternative digital spaces, which has direct implications for counterterrorism strategy, online governance, and the design of prevention interventions that must look beyond a single social media platform.This article is a strong and timely contribution to understanding the resilience and adaptability of online extremist networks. Its empirical methodology and ecological approach make it especially valuable for both researchers and policymakers concerned with online radicalization and digital platform policy.The article’s strength is its empirical rigor—using data to compare how different jihadi groups responded to disruption on Twitter and where they redirected their link‑sharing to keep their networks alive. It combines social network analysis with platform studies to create a nuanced picture of jihadi online behavior. Another strength is its policy relevance: by identifying non‑Twitter platforms commonly used by these groups, the research provides actionable insights for counterterrorism and platform regulation. However, a limitation is that it only captures a snapshot (2017–2018), and online ecologies evolve rapidly, which may limit its applicability for understanding current dynamics. Furthermore, while the out‑linking analysis shows where jihadi users go, it does not deeply analyze the content or engagement quality on those other platforms. Compared to other works (for example, earlier studies by Conway et al. on takedown of IS content), this article stands out by broadening the focus beyond IS to show more plural jihadi ecology and migratory dynamics across platforms.