About Book

In this article, Brill and Bernhard argue that while radiological terrorism—such as “dirty bomb” attacks—remains a preventable threat, existing international control mechanisms are insufficiently robust or universally enforced. They examine gaps in the governance of radioactive sources, call for stronger binding measures, and emphasize the need for states to adopt stricter national regulations, better international cooperation, and more effective enforcement through institutions like the IAEA. The authors propose that global norms and legal tools should be reinforced, including better information-sharing, clearer accountability, and regular review mechanisms. The relevance of this article to the current era is high: as non-state actors continue to seek radiological materials for malicious ends, Brill and Bernhard’s recommendations offer concrete policy prescriptions for strengthening global radiological security, making their work directly applicable for policymakers, nuclear regulators, and counterterrorism stakeholders aiming to prevent catastrophic radiological incidents.This article is a highly significant and timely contribution to the discourse on radiological terrorism and nuclear security policy. It combines thoughtful analysis with actionable policy recommendations, making it both intellectually rigorous and practically relevant.Strengths: The paper’s strength lies in its clear articulation of policy gaps and its advocacy for stronger international legal and regulatory frameworks. Brill and Bernhard leverage their expertise to bridge policy and technical dimensions of radiological risk, pushing for concrete reforms rather than merely diagnosing the problem. Their call for improved IAEA mechanisms and binding controls is grounded in practical experience and aligns with broader nonproliferation objectives. Weaknesses: As a short journal article (only a few pages), it may not delve deeply into the technical challenges of implementing its proposed measures. There is limited discussion of the political challenges or potential resistance from states in strengthening binding international regimes. Moreover, it does not provide a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the reforms, which might limit uptake by resource-constrained states. Unique Contributions: Compared to other literature on nuclear security, this piece stands out in its radiological focus (rather than strictly nuclear weapons), and in pushing for stronger legal instruments and global governance. While many works address nonproliferation and nuclear-material security, fewer emphasize the need for tightening control over radiological sources and enhancing international accountability.