About Article

In the years since the emergence of Boko Haram, the terror threat posed by the sect’s violent extremism has remained a challenge for the Nigerian government. The failure to contain it has been attributed to the government’s over-reliance on military strategies. While conventional approaches are useful in weakening the operational capacity of domestic terrorism, they do not provide a long-term solution. The use of military strategies to quell ideological and religious-driven terrorism has proven counterproductive. As a result, scholars and security practitioners have recommended a combination of military and non-military strategies to address insurgency. Non-military strategies include de-radicalization, disarmament, amnesty, indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, and other soft power measures. In line with this, the Nigerian government adopted ‘Operation Safe Corridor’ in a bid to de-radicalize, rehabilitate and reintegrate former Boko Haram combatants who voluntarily surrender to the government. This article assesses Operation Safe Corridor’s institutional mechanisms as a counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria. It argues that the lack of a legal framework, issues of public perception and trust and host communities’ reluctance to accept former Boko Haram combatants have undermined successful implementation of the program. It is imperative for the government to address these challenges in order to achieve Operation Safe Corridor’s objectives and ensure successful deradicalization and reintegration of former combatants